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Infection control professionals worldwide rely on the
Guideline for Isolation Precautions in Hospitals promulgated
by the Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory
Committee of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(1). This widely venerated document has assumed almost
ecclesiastical authority. The guidelines have been framed
carefully to reflect current evidence and opinion on the modes
of transmission of nosocomial pathogens, and it is this
rigorous evidence-based process that insures their credibility.
However, scrutiny of guidelines addressing the nosocomial
spread of viral pathogens reveals the fragile data on which
many of the recommendations are based.
Evidence on modes of transmission of viruses tends to be
the most fragmentary and unconvincing. When the first
Decennial Conference was held, viral diagnostics was in its
infancy, and few hospital clinical laboratories were equipped
to assist infection control professionals in understanding the
epidemiology of nosocomial viral disease. Moreover, our
current knowledge about the spread of infection by droplets
and droplet nuclei is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was
not that long ago that all infections were thought to be spread
by miasms, those putrid vapors emanating from decomposing
organic matter and environmental filth. William Farr, an
excellent epidemiologist and close colleague of Florence
Nightingale, firmly believed that the 1849 cholera outbreak
in London was caused by miasms rising from the fetid River
Thames. Malaria (literally from the Italian root, mal aria, or
“bad air”) and yellow fever were attributed to miasms before
their mosquito vectors were discovered near the turn of the
century. Indeed, some authorities predicted with confidence
that these diseases, which killed thousands of workers who
were trying to dig the Panama Canal, would be eradicated as
soon as the canal trench was filled with water, sealing over
the miasm-generating tropical ooze. Not until mid-century
did Wells et al. at Johns Hopkins demonstrate that tiny
droplet nuclei could convey infectious microorganisms over
long distances from patient to patient (2).
What, then, do we know about the transmission of
common, clinically important nosocomial viruses? Studies of
three viruses of importance to pediatric hospital epidemiolo-
gists (respiratory syncytial virus [RSV], influenza virus, and
rhinovirus) illustrate that modes of transmission have been
clarified somewhat but that serious gaps in our knowledge
persist. Many of these studies should provide inspiration for
young hospital epidemiologists and infection control
professionals. Almost without exception, they were performed
by hard-nosed investigators who had little, if any, external
funding—investigators who exploited serendipitous events or
devised and conducted original studies on a shoestring.
RSV
RSV is the most important cause of respiratory infection
in young children worldwide, infecting virtually every child in
the first few years of life. Immunity is feeble and fleeting, and
repeated infections are the rule. One in every 100 or 200
infected infants requires hospitalization, usually for
bronchiolitis. Therefore, pediatric hospital wards are flooded
with patients with community-acquired RSV every winter,
and failure to follow fastidious infection control procedures
inevitably leads to nosocomial transmission (3,4). RSV is, in
fact, one of the “perennial weeds” on pediatric wards that
Caroline Breese Hall discussed at this same conference 20
years ago (5). The consequences of RSV infection can be
especially dire for children with underlying conditions such as
prematurity, cardiac and pulmonary disease, or immunosup-
pression (6-9). Nosocomial RSV infection in immunocompro-
mised adults results in prolonged, substantial illness and
even death (10). RSV also takes a heavy toll on members of the
nursing and medical staff, with attack rates in some studies
approaching 50% (5). Bronchiolitis does not develop in health-
care providers because, as adults, they have considerably
larger airways than infants; however, severe colds and
reactive airway disease do develop (11). Because winter is the
busiest time of year on pediatric wards, ill staff members
seldom take time off to recuperate, thus serving as efficient
vectors in the chain of disease transmission.
Since RSV is a respiratory virus, one might be tempted to
speculate that it is transmitted primarily by droplet nuclei or
droplet contact. However, Hall et al. demonstrated clearly
that contact transmission predominates (12). Freshly
infected infants, who were producing copious secretions, were
placed in a crib in a room reserved for the study. Volunteers
were brought into the room and assigned to one of three
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groups. “Cuddlers” performed routine care, picked the baby
up, and played with the child. “Touchers” had extensive
contact with objects in the baby’s environment, which had
been contaminated heavily with secretions. “Sitters” sat right
next to the crib for 3 hours but did not touch anything in the
baby’s environment. None of the 14 sitters developed RSV
infection, but five of the seven cuddlers and four of the 10
touchers became ill.
Infants secrete enormous concentrations of RSV, often
more than 107/mL of nasal discharge, and the concentration of
virus diminishes only slowly over a period of days (13).
Moreover, RSV survives well on fomites; for example, virus
can be cultured for >5 hours on impervious surfaces such as
bed rails (14). Thus, care givers have numerous opportunities
to contaminate their hands during routine care, and unless
they wash their hands, virus will be transmitted by indirect
contact to other infants. Furthermore, symptomatic infection
has a high probability of developing in care givers who touch
their eyes or nose with contaminated fingers.
Numerous studies have evaluated potential strategies to
control nosocomial transmission of RSV. Gowns and masks
were studied before the modes of transmission of RSV were
understood fully (15,16). These studies, which were
underpowered, did not detect a beneficial impact on the rate of
cross-infection. Hall’s group, recognizing that the eyes are an
unprotected portal for inoculation of virus in health-care
workers, evaluated especially designed eye-nose goggles that
ward staff could wear when caring for infants infected with
RSV (17). Although these goggles reduced the rate of infection
in care givers and infants to 5% and 6%, respectively, the
goggles were not well accepted by the staff and eventually
were abandoned.
Studies at Children’s Hospital, Boston, provide consider-
able support for the key role of contact with contaminated
secretions in RSV transmission, as well as the value of
wearing gowns and gloves when caring for infected patients
(18). Surreptitious surveillance of compliance with gown and
glove precautions on a general pediatric ward documented
adherence in only 38.5% of encounters with ill infants. When
open monitoring, education, and feedback of nosocomial
infection rates were introduced, compliance reached levels as
high as 95% and remained very good even after surreptitious
surveillance was reintroduced. The rate of nosocomial RSV
infection fell from 6.4 to 3.1 cases per 1,000 patient days. The
magnitude of the effect was by far the greatest at the peak of
the winter epidemic in the community, when the ward was
crowded with infected infants. Thus, simple barrier
precautions, including wearing gloves when touching
contaminated objects, proved extremely effective in limiting
RSV transmission. Of course, it is possible that excellent
compliance with handwashing might obviate the need for
gloves, as is the case for all nosocomial infections transmitted
from patient to patient by contaminated hands. Isaacs et al.
(19) found that handwashing and cohorting were effective in
reducing the nosocomial infection rate. For RSV, using a hand
antisepsis agent that contains detergent or alcohol is critical.
Aqueous chlorhexidine without detergent has poor activity
against RSV (20).
Some investigators have advocated performing rapid
tests for RSV on all symptomatic infants during the annual
RSV season, cohorting RSV-positive patients, and placing
them on gown and glove precautions. Madge found that this
approach was more effective than gowns and gloves or
cohorting alone (21), although compliance was not measured.
Snydman noted a reduction in nosocomial infection in a
newborn nursery when rapid testing was combined with
cohorting, visitation restrictions, and gowns, gloves, and
masks (22). However, the cost-effectiveness of routinely
testing all symptomatic infants for RSV remains to be
demonstrated conclusively. Once the virology laboratory has
documented that the RSV season has started, a child with
bronchiolitis will likely have RSV, and screening only
children who have atypical symptoms may be sufficient.
Recently, investigators using polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) to detect RSV RNA suggested that RSV might be
transmitted over considerable distances by air (23). RNA was
found in air samples taken as far as 7 m from the bedside of
infected patients for up to day 7 of hospitalization. However,
a positive PCR result does not prove that infectious virus is
present, and it seems premature to use such data to refute
excellent epidemiologic studies by several groups of
investigators documenting the primary importance of contact
transmission.
Influenza
Influenza is a substantial threat to hospitalized patients
despite the availability of a relatively effective vaccine and
two classes of drugs (M2 ion channel inhibitors and
neuraminidase inhibitors) shown to prevent infection in
clinical trials (24). Although influenza is widely viewed as
affecting primarily elderly patients and adults with
coexisting illnesses or conditions, such as chronic pulmonary
and cardiac disease, nosocomial transmission has been well
documented in young children (25,26). Perhaps nosocomial
disease is less frequently diagnosed in hospitalized children
because infants are unable to articulate many of influenza’s
characteristic symptoms, and influenza often presents simply
as an episode of fever in this population.
The proper isolation procedures for hospitalized patients
with influenza are controversial. Infection can likely be
transmitted by direct and indirect contact, as well as by
droplet contact. Airborne spread by droplet nuclei has
sparked controversy, since true airborne transmission would
best be controlled by isolating patients in rooms with negative
air pressure and requiring staff to wear masks on entering the
room. Such precautions would be costly and difficult to
implement at the height of an influenza outbreak.
What is the evidence for airborne transmission of
influenza? The explosive nature of influenza outbreaks
supports airborne transmission. Some investigators have
even suggested that the rapid intercontinental transmission
of influenza can be mediated by transport of aerosolized virus
on air currents over hundreds to thousands of kilometers in
low-pressure centers with frontal waves (27). However, data
substantiating the airborne theory of transmission are
relatively sparse. Perhaps the most compelling data come
from animal models of influenza. Mice inoculated with
influenza virus readily transmitted infection to susceptible
animals from which they had been separated by double wire
screens (28). The attack rate increased at low relative
humidity, as would be expected, since virus suspended in
aerosolized droplet nuclei survives much longer at lower
humidity. Moreover, transmission occurred more frequently
when the ventilation in the chamber housing the mice was
poor, as Wells established is typical of diseases spread by the
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transmitted influenza to uninfected ferrets separated by a 9-
foot duct with two 90° bends (29). Large droplets certainly
would not be able to negotiate such curves, whereas droplet
nuclei typically can.
A natural experiment in patients at the Veterans
Administration Hospital in Livermore, California, can be
viewed as the human counterpart of these animal
experiments (30). One building housing 150 patients with
tuberculosis and chronic pulmonary disease was ventilated
by UV light-irradiated air, whereas another part of the
hospital housing 250 tuberculosis patients received
nonirradiated air. During the 1957-58 influenza season, the
attack rate in patients in the irradiated building (as
confirmed serologically) was 2%, but the attack rates among
patients and staff in the nonirradiated area were 19% and
18%, respectively.
Probably the most dramatic example of airborne spread
in humans occurred during an airplane flight from Anchorage
to Kodiak, Alaska (31). At an intermediate stop in Homer,
Alaska, the plane had mechanical difficulty and remained on
the tarmac for several hours with an inoperative ventilation
system. A young woman had boarded the flight in Homer and
within 15 minutes developed full-blown symptoms of acute
influenza. A point-source outbreak of influenza ensued, and
72% of the 54 passengers became ill within 72 hours. The
attack rate was highest in passengers who remained on the
crippled plane the longest, and the six passengers who
deplaned immediately remained well. Although the passen-
gers who stayed on the plane moved about at will, influenza
developed in few of those who had close contact with the index
patient.
Since available evidence tends to support airborne
transmission of influenza, attempting to place infected
patients on precautions suitable for protecting susceptible
patients and staff from virus-laden droplet nuclei seems
prudent. Of course, improved compliance with current
recommendations for immunizing health-care workers
remains the key to influenza control in the hospital. Most
facilities will be severely challenged if they try to isolate all
patients with symptoms compatible with influenza.
Rhinovirus
Although nosocomial rhinovirus infection is not as
substantial a problem as RSV and influenza on pediatric
wards, it can have serious sequelae in premature neonates
and children with chronic diseases or immunosuppression
(32). For example, in another session at this decennial
meeting, Huskins and his colleagues at Children’s Hospital,
Boston, report an outbreak of rhinovirus infection at a
pediatric chronic-care facility that was associated with
considerable illness and death. However, there is another
reason to discuss the transmission of rhinovirus–namely,
that this pathogen demonstrates the difficulty in proving
conclusively how respiratory viruses are transmitted.
The common cold is a profound nuisance in everyday life,
although seldom a cause of serious illness. The average child
can expect to have four to eight episodes per year, and adults
three to five infections. Many viruses, such as parainfluenza,
RSV, and coronavirus, can produce similar symptoms, but
rhinovirus is by far the most frequent etiologic agent. Repeated
colds are virtually guaranteed because there are >100 distinct
rhinovirus serotypes, and infection with one serotype does not
confer substantial immunity against the others.
A prodigious volume of work at the Common Cold
Research Unit in Salisbury, England, following World War II
established that colds could be produced by inoculating
secretions into the nose or eye of volunteers (33). These rather
crude experiments were replicated with nasal inoculation of
small concentrations of rhinovirus once the specific viral
agents that cause the common cold were elucidated (34).
Presumably, therefore, persons might acquire rhinovirus by
touching their nasal or ocular mucosa with contaminated
fingers. A study by Hendley et al. at the University of Virginia
demonstrated that health-care workers are not immune to
practices that might promote self-inoculation (35). One third
of grand-rounds attendees picked their nose, and one in 2.7
rubbed their eyes during a 1-hour lecture. Subsequent work
demonstrated that it was difficult to transmit rhinovirus by
kissing (36), and that exposure to cold did not increase the
likelihood of “catching a cold” (37).
These studies could not answer the central question of
whether rhinovirus is transmitted primarily by direct
contact, indirect contact, droplet contact, or droplet nuclei.
Unfortunately, considerable additional investigation has not
resolved the issue completely (38). Essentially, two
experimental approaches, both highly contrived, have come to
different conclusions. Work by Hendley and Gwaltney at the
University of Virginia generally has supported transmission
by hand contact and self-inoculation, while experiments by
Dick at the University of Wisconsin have favored spread by
large droplets, droplet nuclei, or both.
The Virginia group demonstrated that adults with
experimental rhinovirus colds readily contaminated their
hands and that rhinovirus could be recovered from 43% of
plastic tiles they touched with their contaminated fingers
(39). Adults with natural rhinovirus colds contaminated their
hands in 39% of cases, and virus was found on 6% of objects in
their homes (35,40). Virus could survive from a few hours to as
long as 4 days on nonporous surfaces, and for at least 2 hours
on human skin (35). Volunteers who had contact with
contaminated objects or with fingers of persons with
rhinovirus colds had a high rate of infection when they
intentionally touched their eyes or nose. Infection generally
could be prevented by treating contaminated surfaces with
disinfectant or applying iodine to fingers (39).
In a labor-intensive, randomized clinical trial, the
Virginia group found that treating mothers’ fingers with
iodine reduced the rate of secondary infection (38).
Specifically, as soon as a cold occurred in another member of
the family, mothers were instructed to dip their fingers in
iodine or placebo when they awoke in the morning, every 3 to
4 hours during the day, and after activities that might wash
the iodine from the skin. The investigators counted on the
well-established residual activity of iodine to kill virus on
contact. Over the 4-year study period, the secondary attack
rate for colds in the intervention group was 7%, versus 20% in
the control group. In the iodine-treated group, no confirmed
rhinovirus infection occurred in susceptible mothers who had
been exposed to 11 index cases. In contrast, five infections
occurred after 16 exposures in the placebo group, although
this difference was not significant.
These studies provide considerable evidence for indirect
contact transmission by contaminated fomites and fingers. In
other experiments, the Virginia investigators found little
support for transmission via large respiratory droplets or
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symptomatic volunteers across a small table (droplet contact
and droplet nucleus transmission) or a double-wire barrier
(droplet nucleus spread) resulted in infections in 1 of 12 and
zero of 10 subjects, respectively (39). These rates of
transmission were far less than the 11 infections among 15
persons (73%) who self-inoculated their mucous membranes
with contaminated fingers.
Meanwhile, the Wisconsin group was developing models
to study transmission of rhinovirus colds, building on
observations showing high attack rates among men crowded
together in a small hut in Antarctica (41). In one such model,
symptomatic volunteers were housed with susceptible
volunteers in a room approximately 12-by-6-by-3 m (42). The
subjects played various board, card, and video games during
the study period. Since viral titers in nasal secretions fall as
symptoms diminish, volunteers were replaced with highly
symptomatic persons as soon as they experienced reduced
rhinorrhea or sneezing. The average length of exposure
required for transmission was very high, 200 hours of
exposure to achieve a 50% attack rate. Based on these results,
Dick et al. suggest that exposure times in the Virginia studies
were too short to exclude droplet and airborne transmission.
In additional experiments, the Wisconsin group extended
these studies by having volunteers play poker for 12 hours
while sitting at round tables (43). Three experiments were
performed involving 24 symptomatic “donors” and 36
susceptible “recipients.” Half of the recipients were fitted with
restraints, either arm braces that allowed them to reach their
cards but not touch their face, or a plastic shield that left their
hands free but did not allow them to reach their eyes or nose.
Despite these barriers, the attack rates were 56% and 67%,
respectively, strongly favoring transmission by air since self-
inoculation was impossible. Moreover, when 12 additional
susceptible volunteers were brought to a separate room to
play poker with chips and cards that were literally soaked
with contaminated secretions from donors, no rhinovirus
infections occurred. In addition, little virus was found on the
chips and cards. The Wisconsin group suggested that the
relatively high attack rates seen in the self-inoculation
studies conducted by the Virginia group might be attributable
to intensive exposure to fresh wet secretions (e.g., the
volunteers literally blew their noses into their hands).
The above studies provide only a glimpse of the extensive
literature on the transmission of rhinovirus colds, but
controversy still simmers. The prudent person probably will
wash his or her hands after shaking hands with someone who
has a cold or after touching environmental objects potentially
contaminated with relatively fresh secretions. Alcohol-based,
waterless antiseptics are ideal for this purpose. Although
droplet contact or airborne transmission of rhinovirus
infection is possible, prolonged and close exposure is
apparently required.
Dr. Goldmann, who is professor of pediatrics at Harvard Medical
School, has a research focus on the epidemiology and control of hospital-
acquired infections, especially antimicrobial drug-resistant infections
in intensive care units. In addition, he studies the epidemiology and
prevention of medical errors and adverse events in pediatrics. Dr.
Goldmann collaborates with colleagues at the Channing Laboratory in
Boston regarding the pathogenesis of staphylococcal foreign body infec-
tions and is working to develop imunologic approaches for their preven-
tion.
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